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A drawer of checks issued payable to an impostor brought
an action against the drawee bank to recover the amount paid
on the checks by the bank and charged to the drawer's ac-
count. The drawer was the victim of two types of fraud
operated by the same two persons. The checks were divided
into two groups. The fraud as to the first group of checks
was operated as follows: one person using the name of a
prominent citizen known to the drawer only by reputation
called the drawer by telephone and solicited funds for chari-
table purposes. Acting upon the speaker's instructions, the
checks were drawn payable to the speaker's secretary. A
second person called at the drawer's home, stated that he was
the secretary, and received the checks from the drawer. The
fraud as to the second group of checks was operated at the
same time in a slightly different manner. The drawer was
contacted by telephone by the same person using the name of
a well known lawyer whom the drawer knew personally but
had not seen for several years. These checks were also drawn
payable to the supposed secretary of the speaker; however,
the checks were then placed in an envelope and delivered by
the drawer to a messenger sent by the impostor for that pur-
pose.' The usual procedure in both groups of checks was for
the speaker to indorse the payee's name upon the checks; the
impostor secretary then indorsed his real name upon the
checks and cashed them.2 The Court of Errors and Appeals
of New Jersey denied recovery to the drawer against the
drawee upon those checks delivered by the drawer to the
impostor payee in person. However, the court allowed the
drawer to recover from the drawee the amount of those
checks delivered by the drawer, not to the impostor payee,
1. The drawer inadvertently made one check payable in the name
assumed by the speaker and delivered it to the messenger. The
court properly treated this check as belonging in the second
series. Instant case at 214.
2. The court held that the fact that the payee's name was indorsed
on the checks not by the impostor, but by his accomplice in the
fraud did not remove the case from the operation of the impostor
rule. Instant case at 215-216.
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but to a messenger sent by the unknown and unseen impostor.
Russell v. Second National Bank of Paterson, 55 A.2d 211
(N.J. 1947).
In the impostor cases there are two parties who might
possibly bear the loss. The first party is the drawer, maker,
or indorser3 from whom the impostor receives the instrument.
The second party is the holder or drawee who takes the instru-
ment from the impostor. Each of these parties has been de-
frauded by the misrepresentation of identity by the impostor.
It thus becomes necessary to determine which of the parties
to the instrument should bear the loss. The incidence of the
loss must be determined by the rights which those who take
the instrument by means of the impostor's indorsement have
as against the party who transferred the instrument to the
impostor.
The majority of the impostor cases have been decided
upon the basis of the "impostor rule," which states that where
the transferor of a negotiabld instrument delivers it to an
impostor supposing that the impostor is the person he has
represented himself to be,4 the indorsement of the impostor
is treated as a genuine indorsement as between the transferor
and a transferee who derives his title to the instrument from
the impostor's indorsement. A few courts have applied §23
of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law to the impostor
cases. By §23 no person can acquire any rights on a negoti-
able instrument by means of a forged indorsement as against
prior parties to the instrument unless such prior parties are
3. Where the instrument is transferred to the impostor by an in-
dorser the problem of the impostor cases arises only where the
transfer is by special indorsement, for if the transfer is by blank
indorsement the instrument becomes payable to bearer. Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law §9(5), Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns
1933) §19-109.
4. Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law §9(3), Ind. Stat. Ann.(Burns 1933) §19-109 which provides: "The instrument is
payable to bearer: . . . . 3. When it is payable to the order
of a fictitious or nonexisting person, and such fact was
known to the person making it so payable;" does not apply
to the impostor payee situation for the reason that a check drawn
payable to an impostor is not so drawn with the knowledge of
the drawer. Security-First Nat. Bank v. U.S., 103 F.2d 188,
189 (C.C.A. 9th 1939); Uriola v. Twin Falls Bank & T. Co., 37
Idaho 332, 345, 215 Pac. 1080, 1087 (1923); Montgomery Garage
Co. v. Manufacturers' Liability Ins. Co., 94 N.J.L. 152, 154, 109
Atl. 296, 297 (1920). But cf. Kohn v. Watkins, 26 Kan. 691(1881) (decided prior to the enactment of the N.I.L. but holding
that a check payable to a fictitious person and delivered to an im-
postor as the supposed agent of the payee was payable to bearer).
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precluded from setting up the forgery.5 Therefore, if §23 is
applicable," the question becomes: is the indorsement of
the impostor a forgery, and, if so, is the transferor precluded
from setting up the forgery?7
The impostor rule is justified by the courts upon two
theories. The first and most prevalent is the intent theory.
It is said that the drawer of a check has two possible intents:
(1) to make the check payable to the person before him (the
impostor), (2) to make the check payable to the person he
believes the impostor to be. The first is generally held to be
the controlling intent.8
5. Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law §23, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns
1933) §19-123: "When a signature is forged or made without au-
thority of the person whose signature it purports to be, it is
wholly 'inoperative, and no right to retain the instrument, or to
give a discharge therefor, or to enforce payment thereof against
any party thereto, can be acquired through or under such signa-
ture, unless the party against whom it is sought to enforce such
right is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of author-ity."
6. It is not proposed to discuss the issue as to whether §23 is appli-
cable to the impostor cases in this note. That issue has been
widely debated by leading authorities with no definite result.
See: "Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law," 14 Harv. L. Rev.
241 (1900); "Brewster, A Defense of the Negotiable Instruments
Law," 10 Yale L. J. 84 (1900); "Ames, The Negotiable Instruments
Law: A Word More," 14 Harv. L. Rev. 442 (1901); Brewster,
"The Negotiable Instruments Law-A Rejoinder to Dean Ames," 15
Harv. L. Rev. 26 (1901).
7. The application of §23 to the impostor cases does not appear to
finally determine the problem. In Tolman v. American Nat. Bank,
22 R.I. 462, 48 At. 480 (1926), the court felt that §23 was appli-
cable and dictated a holding for the drawer against the drawee.
However, in Montgomery Garage Co. v. Manufacturers' Liability
Ins. Co., 94 N.J.L. 152, 109 Atl. 296 (1920), the court felt that
if the indorsement of the impostor was a forgery within the
meaning of §23 the drawer was precluded from setting up the
forgery; accord, Security-First Nat. Bank v. U.S., 103 F.2d 188,
191 (C.C.A. 9th 1939). It has also been said that §23 is merely
declaratory of the common law. U.S. v. First Nat. Bank of
Prague, 124 F.2d 484, 486 (C.C.A. 10th 1941).
8. Continental-American Bank & T. Co. v. U.S., 161 F.2d 935 (C.C.A.
5th 1947); U.S. v. First Nat. Bank, Albuquerque, 131 F.2d 985(C.C.A. 10th 1942); Schweitzer v. Bank of America N.T. & S.A.,
42 Cal.App. 2d 536, 109 P.2d 441 (1941); Meridian Nat. Bank
of Indianapolis v. First Nat. Bank of Shelbyville, 7 Ind.App.
322, 33 N.E. 247, on rehearing, 34 N.E. 608 (1893) ; Meyer v. Ind
Nat. Bank, 27 Ind.App. 354, 61 N.E. 596 (1901); Robertson v. Cole-
man, 141 Mass. 231, 4 N.E. 619 (1886); First Nat. Bank of Fort
Worth v. American Exch. Nat. Bank, 49 App.Div. 349, 63 N.Y.Supp.
58 (1900); Land Title & T. Co. v. Northwestern Nat. Bank, 196
Pa. 230, 46 At. 420 (1900); cf. Cohen v. Lincoln Savings Bank,
275 N.Y. 399, 10 N.E.2d 457 (1937) (purports to follow the in-
tent theory, but requires some dealings between the tranferor and
the impostor prior to the delivery of the check before it becomes
the transferor's intent that the check be paid to the impostor;
[Vol 23
1948] NOTES 487
The second theory of the impostor rule is the negligence
or estoppel theory, or the maxim that as between two inno-
cent persons the one whose act caused the loss must bear the
consequences. 9 Proponents of the negligence theory say that
the drawer has a duty to use diligence in determining the
identity of persons with whom he deals.1o However, the
drawee has a corresponding duty to pay the proceeds of the
check only upon the order of the payee designated by the
drawer.". The negligence theory therefore not only raises a
duty of diligence in the drawer but in effect declares that the
failure of the drawer to fulfill this duty relieves the drawee
from his corresponding duty to the drawer. 2
the requirement of prior dealings finds no support in the prior
cases). Contra: Palm v. Watt, 7 Hun. 317 (N.Y. 1876); Tolman
v. American Nat. Bank, 22 R.I. 462, 48 Atl. 480 (1901).
9. U.S. v, Nat. Exch. Bank, 45 Fed. 163 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1891);
Boatsman v. Stockmen's Nat. Bank, 56 Colo. 495, 138 Pac. 764(1914); Peninsular State Bank of Michigan v. First Nat. Bank,
245 Mich. 179, 222 N.W. 157 (1928); Montgomery Garage Co. v.
Manufacturers' Liability Ins. Co., 94 N.J.L. 152, 109 Atl. 296(1920); Forbes v. Espy, 21 Ohio St. 474 (1871).
10. Central Nat. Bank v. Nat. Metropolitan Bank, 31 App. D.C. 391(1908). But cf. U.S. v. Mercantile Nat. Bank, 67 F.Supp 759(W.D. La. 1946), where the impostor adopted the identity of a
veteran's widow and thereby secured five government checks which
she indorsed by mark in the name of the payee. The United
States was allowed to recover from the collecting bank upon the
ground that the drawer is under no duty to exercise diligence In
the issuance of a check such that no possible mistake may occur.
However, the court apparently failed to realize it was dealing with
an impostor case and decided the case upon the basis of Nat.
Metropolitan Bank v. U.S., 323 U.S. 454 (1945) (federal employee
fraudently procured the issuance of checks and indorsed them in
the name of the payees) and Clearfield Trust Co. v. U.S., 318
U.S. 363 (1943) (U.S. check apparently stolen from the mails
and the payee's name forged thereon). The Supreme Court cases
relied upon have no application to the impostor situation.
11. Nat. Metropolitan Bank v. Realty Appraisal & Title Co., 60 App.
D.C. 86, 47 F.2d 982 (1931).
12. One writer has carefully analyzed the cases prior to 1940 and has
advanced the following conclusions as to the basis of the decisions.
The issuer or transferor from whom the impostor takes is re-
ferred to as the first victim, and those taking from the impostor
are referred to as the second victim. Where neither victim has
exercised care, the loss has fallen upon the first victim; where
both victims have exercised some care, the loss has fallen upon
the first victim (decisions not unanimous); where the first victim
has exercised no care and the second victim has exercised some
care, the loss has fallen upon the first victim; where the first
victim has exercised some care and the second victim has exer-
cised no care, the loss has fallen upon the second victim (decisions
not unanimous). Abel, "The Impostor Payee: or, Rhode Island
Was Right," [1940] Wis. L. Rev. 161. It thus appears from this
analysis that the loss falls upon the drawee only where the drawer
exercises due care and the drawee fails to exercise due care.
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The intent theory justifies placing the loss upon the
drawer in those cases where the drawer and the impostor
payee deal face to face whether the impostor assumes a wholly
fictitious identity or assumes the identity of a real person.
In either case, the controlling intent of the drawer is to make
the check payable to the person with whom he is dealing.13
Thus, in one phase of the instant case, the court held that
where the drawer dealt face to face with an impostor who
had adopted a fictitious name, the controlling intent of the
drawer was to make the check payable to the person before
her.14
The application of the negligence theory to those cases
where the drawer and the impostor deal face to face raises
the question: what amount of inquiry by the drawer dis-
charges his duty to the drawee?15 Where the impostor has
assumed the identity of a real person and made representa-
tions consistent with the assumed identity, an inquiry as to
the impostor's representations other than identity would nor-
mally fail to disclose the fraud. 6 However, it does not seem
unreasonable in such cases to require the drawer to investi-
gate the representations as to identity, for he has an adequate
opportunity to make the investigation. By the negligence
13. In Meridian Nat. Bank of Indianapolis v. First Nat. Bank of
Shelbyville, 7 Ind.App. 322, 33 N.E. 247, on rehearing, 34 N.E. 608(1893), the impostor assumed a fictitious name, sold stolen cattle to
the drawer, and received in return a check payable to W. C. Smith,
the assumed name. This check was certified by the drawee bank
and cashed by the plaintiff bank. As against the defendant
drawee the indorsement of the impostor as payee was held suffi-
cient to pass title. In Meyer v. Ind. Nat. Bank, 27 Ind.App. 354,
61 N.E. 596 (1901), the impostor assumed the name of an owner
of real estate and by means of a forged mortgage upon the land
secured two loans from the drawer. The loans were executed
by checks payable to Volney J. Dawson, the name of the owner
of the land. The defendant drawee paid the checks to the im-
postor upon his indorsement as payee. In affirming a judgment
for the drawee, the court said that the check was paid to the in-
dividual designated by and named in it.
14. Instant case at 214-216.
15. Upon the basis of Professor Abel's analysis of the cases, n.7
supra, no amount of inquiry by the drawer will shift the loss to
the drawee unless the drawee fails to exercise some care.
16. In Commerical Bank & T. Co. v. Southern Industrial Banking
Corp., 16 Tenn.App. 141, 66 S.W.2d 209 (1932), the impostor
adopted the name of a real person and negotiated a loan from
the drawer. The drawer made no inquiry as to the impostor's
identity; an investigation as to his financial standing revealed
that a person of the name assumed by the impostor had a satis-
factory credit rating. The holder required no identification of
the impostor; however, the court held that the drawer intended
that the check be paid to the impostor.
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theory, if the drawer fails to detect the fraud, he is estopped
to deny the impostor's indorsement.
In the instant case, the court recognized that the intent
theory does not justify placing the, loss upon the drawer
where delivery was to an agent of the impostor payee.17 This
was true because the drawer had in mind only a name as payee
of the check; there was no person connected with that name
in the mind of the drawer."s The court dismissed without
discussion the negligence theory as a means of throwing the
loss upon the drawer. 9 In this connection it should be noted
that the slightest inquiry by the drawer of the person whose
name was used to accomplish the fraud would have revealed
the fraud.2 0  Therefore, if the result is justifiable, it must be
so in spite of the negligence theory of the impostor rule or
upon the basis that no inquiry is expected of a drawer in these
circumstances.
A more difficult case for decision arises when the drawer
and the impostor payee do not deal face to face but deal with
each other by means of mail or telegrams. Again the ma-
jority of the decisions place the loss upon the drawer,2' but
the result is difficult to justify under either theory of the
17. This phase of the instant case should not be confused with the
well recognized exception to the impostor rule where the check
is delivered to the impostor, not as payee, but as the agent of
the payee. In such cases the loss falls upon the drawee who pays
the check upon the indorsement of the payee's name by the im-
postor. Russell v. First Nat. Bank of Hartselle, 2 Ala.App. 242,
56 So. 868 (1911); McCornack v. Central State Bank, 203 Iowa
838, 211 N.W. 542 (1926); Armstrong v. Pomeroy Nat. Bank,
46 Ohio St. 512, 22 N.E. 866 (1889). Contra: Ryan v. Bank of
Italy Nat. T. & S. A., 106 Cal.App. 690, 289 Pac. 863 (1930);
Kohn v. Watkins, 26 Kan. 691 (1881).
18. "Here not only was the name of the payee fictitious but there
was no one representing himself as, or represented by another
to be, the person of that name. The name had no embodiment
and presented no objectivity." Instant case at 216.
19. Instant case at 216.
20. The fraud in the instant case was discovered when the drawer
received simultaneous requests for donations to both charities.
She became understandably confused and placed each check in an
envelope addressed to the supposed solicitor of the other check.
When she subsequently met one of the persons whose name was
being used to accomplish the fraud she apologized for her error;
whereupon the fraud was disclosed.
21. Uriola v. Twin Falls Bank & T. Co., 37 Idaho 332, 215 Pac. 1080
(1923); Maloney v. Clark, 6 Kan. 82 (1870); Emporia Nat. Bank
v. Shotwell, 35 Kan. 360, 11 Pac. 141 (1886); Hoffman v. Amer.
Exch. Nat. Bank, 2 Neb. (Unoff.) 217, 96 N.W. 112 (1902); ef.
Forbes v. Espy, 21 Ohio St. 474 (1871). Contra: Moore v. Moul-
trie Banking Co., 39 Ga.App. 687, 148 S.E. 311 (1929); Palm v.
Watt, 7 Hun 317 (N.Y. 1876).
1948]
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impostor rule. The similarity of the mail cases to that phase
of the instant case in which the drawer delivered the checks
to an agent of the impostor is so great that any attempt to
distinguish the cases is not only difficult but there is no
apparent basis to justify the distinction. In each case there
is an absence of face to face dealings and consequently the
drawer has no physical being in mind as the payee. If any
distinction is possible, it is that in the instant case the mes-
senger was the agent of the impostor, while in the mail cases
the post office is the agent of the sender.2 2
The intent theory breaks down completely in the mail
cases. It cannot be said that the drawer has any person in
mind as the payee of the check for in fact the drawer has
only a name in mind as the payee.23 In the usual case of this
type the impostor assumes the name of a real person; there-
fore, the negligence theory is no more successful in justifying
placing the loss upon the drawer. As a practical matter, the
drawer cannot go to the expense and trouble of making a
complete inquiry and the normal inquiry would disclose that
a person of the name which the impostor has adopted is
everything which the impostor has represented himself to be.21
22. United States Post Office Regulations (1940) §§729, 730 provide
for the withdrawal and recall of mail by the sender thereof upon
written application to the postmaster at the office of mailing, stat-
ing the reasons for such request. Such mail must be returned to
the sender if it has not been delivered to the addressee. This
regulation is the basis for holding that the post office is the
agent of the sender. Guardian Nat. Bank v. Huntington County
State Bank, 206 Ind. 185, 192-196, 187 N.E. 388, 390-391 (1933).
Compare Maloney v. Clark, 6 Kan. 82 (1870), where the impostor
assumed the name of the drawer's brother and hired an attorney
to secure money from the drawer. The drawer sent the drafts
to the attorney payable to his brother. The court held that the
attorney was the drawer's agent for the delivery of the checks;
therefore, the loss fell upon the drawer.
23. "The criminal fraud of R. (the impostor) induced the defendants
to send their check, not to him, but to John M. Gillespie (drawer's
son), to whom it was made payable. There was no delivery nor
intention to deliver the check to R., and no authority conferred
upon him to take the letter inclosing it from the postoffice, or
to make any disposition of the check." Palm v. Watt, 7 Hun.
317, 318 (N.Y. 1876).
24. In Emporia Nat. Bank v. Shotwell, 35 Kan. 360, 11 Pac. 141(1886), the impostor assumed the name of the owner of certain
land and secured a loan by mail by means of forged mortgages
upon this land. A search of the public records showed the land
to be owned by one having the name assumed by the impostor.
It would appear that the drawer could not have intended his
check to be paid to any person other than the owner of the land;
however, the court held that it was the lender's intent that the
check be paid to the impostor.
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Any rule which determines which of the parties to the
instrument should bear the loss resulting from the impostor's
fraud should take into account two factors: (1) preserving
the free circulation of commercial paper, and (2) the oppor-
tunity of the parties to protect themselves against loss. One
means of furthering negotiability is to cut down the defenses
available to prior parties to the instrument. Thus, in the
impostor cases it has been argued that it would aid nego-
tiability to place the loss upon the one who transferred the
paper to an impostor.25
However, is it desirable to encourage negotiability at the
expense of those persons who of necessity must make use of
negotiable paper? The transferee of the instrument is under
no duty to take the paper and need not do so unless the holder
can clearly establish his right to the paper. As a practical
matter, the transferee and the impostor usually deal face to
face and the transferee thus has an opportunity to protect
himself against loss. 2 6  Does the transferor have an equal
opportunity? Where the transferor and the impostor deal
face to face it is obvious that the former's opportunity to
protect himself is equal to that of the transferee. However,
where the transferor and the impostor do not deal face to
face but deal by means of mail, telegraph, or other agency of
communication, including a personal messenger of the im-
postor as in the instant case, the transferor's opportunity to
protect himself is not equal to that of the transferee. As has
been previously stated, the normal inquiry made by the trans-
feror reveals only that a person of the name assumed by the
impostor is everything the impostor has represented himself
to be. A complete inquiry which would disclose the fraud is
normally too burdensome to be practical. It thus becomes
25. Notes, 38 Col. L. Rev. 171, 173 (1938); 32 fI1. L. Rev. 731, 732(1938); 24 Va. L. Rev. 192, 193-194 (1938).
26. The opportunity of the transferee to protect himself from loss
was recognized in Rosin v. Lawrence Byars Used Car Post, 30
Ala.App. 576, 10 So.2d 48 (1942), an action by the holder against
the drawer upon a check on which the drawer had stopped pay-
ment after learning of the fraud. The court recognized the im-
postor rule but held that when the drawer informed the holder
upon inquiry, "it's all right to cash the check if you know that
the man presenting it is Sergeant J. M. Phillips (the named
payee)," the burden of ascertaining the impostor's identity was
transferred to the holder who took the check from the impostor.
Why should it be necessary that these words be spoken? Should
not every check carry with it the representation, "it is all right
to cash the check if you know that the man presenting it is" the
person he represents himself to be?
19481 NOTES
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necessary for the transferor to rely upon the banking system
to pay the paper to the proper person. This necessity and
the transferee's ever present opportunity to protect himself
should relieve the transferor from loss in such cases.
It is submitted, therefore, that the true basis of decision
in the impostor cases should be the practical opportunity of
the parties to protect themselves from loss and the use to
which each party has put this opportunity. Stated otherwise,
each party to a negotiable instrument should have the duty of
conforming to sound business practice and failing to so act,
he should bear the loss due to his neglect. 27
But what effect would this rationale have upon the case
law of the impostor cases? The possible cases must be exam-
ined to answer this question:
1. The transferor and an impostor assuming either the
identity of a real person or a wholly fictitious identity deal
face to face. The transferor and the transferee have equal
opportunities to protect themselves against loss; therefore,
the loss should fall upon the transferor, for his failure to
detect the fraud makes the later fraud upon the transferee
possible. This reasoning accords with the estoppel theory;
the result is in accord with both the estoppel and intent
theories.
2. The transferor and an impostor assuming the identity
of a real person deal by means of mail, telegraph, or other
agency of communication, and the imposter makes represen-
tations consistent with the assumed identity. The transferee
27. Thus, in U.S. v. First Nat. Bank of Prague, 124 F.2d 484 (C.C.A.
10th 1941), the impostor negotiated a loan by mail from the Vet-
erans' Administration upon a stolen adjusted-service certificate.
The loan was handled through the defendant bank which also
cashed the check representing the proceeds of the loan. The cer-
tificate establishing the impostor's identity was witnessed by the
president of the bank in his capacity as a notary public. The
court allowed the United States to recover the amount of the
check from the bank, stating at page 488, "Thus the issuance
and mailing of the check to the imposter was not the first act
which made possible the loss. On the contrary, by first reposing
confidence in him and by cooperating with him as indicated, the
bank unwittingly contributed to the deception of the Administra-
tion in respect to the vital matter of identity; and such coopera-
tion constituted the initial act which resulted in the imposter
fraudently obtaining money to which he was not entitled. The
act and conduct of the bank, without being so intended, facilitated
the fraud and primarily made possible the loss. Stated otherwise,
the bank unwittingly cooperated with the imposter in setting in
motion the train of events which culminated in the loss." Or
the person having the best opportunity to detect the fraud and
failing to do so should bear the loss.
[Vol 23
NOTES
has the only practical opportunity to detect a fraud as to the
identity of the impostor and should bear the loss. This reason-
ing does not accord with either theory of the impostor rule,
and the result is contra to the majority view.
3. The transferor and an impostor assuming the identity
of a real person deal by means of mail, telegraph, or other
agency of communication, and the impostor makes representa-
tions inconsistent with the assumed identity. The normal
inquiry of the transferor would reveal the inconsistent repre-
sentations; therefore, it is reasonable to require the transferor
to make a further investigation which would reveal the fraud.
While this inquiry is more difficult for the transferor than
for a transferee who is dealing face to face with the impostor,
it would be unreasonable to allow the transferor to proceed
with the transaction in spite of the inconsistency of represen-
tations. If he elects to do so, he should bear the resulting
loss. This reasoning accords with the estoppel theory; the-
result is in accord with both the estoppel and intent theories.
4. The transferor and an impostor assuming a wholly fic-
titious identity deal by means of mail, telegraph, or other
agency of communication. The normal inquiry of the trans-
feror would detect the fraud as to the identity of the im-
postor; therefore, the transferor should bear the loss. This
reasoning accords with the estoppel theory; the result is in
accord with the majority view under both theories.
This analysis of the possible impostor situations shows
that the above rationale of the impostor cases would change
the majority view only at what is, on principle, its weakest
link-the mail cases in which the impostor has assumed the
identity of a real person and made representations consistent
with that identity. With regard to free circulation of com-
mercial paper, this rationale should have a negligible deterrent
effect upon negotiability. In fact, if the above rationale
compels those persons who do not wish to conform to sound
business practice to cease using negotiable paper, it should
prove to further the free circulation of negotiable instruments.
19481
